Fiscal discipline and the choice of a nominal anchor in stabilization
发现拉丁美洲经验不支持汇率锚比货币锚更能促进财政纪律的传统观点，并构建模型解释为何在政策制定者缺乏耐心时，货币锚稳定化能带来更强的财政纪律和更高福利。
The conventional wisdom is that exchange rate-based stabilizations induce more fiscal discipline than money-based programs. The Latin American experience does not support this view. Among the major stabilization programs implemented since 1960, the mean increase in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio was 3.2 percentage points under money-based programs, as opposed to only 0.2 percentage points under exchange rate-based programs. We present a model – where fiscal policy is set by an optimizing but non-benevolent government – that replicates this stylized fact. If the policy maker is impatient, a money-based stabilization provides more discipline, and higher welfare for the representative agent, than does an exchange rate-based stabilization.