Career Concerns in Teams
研究委托人承诺能力如何影响团队合作。当双方对成员能力不确定时，若委托人无法承诺长期合同，员工会因职业关切而暗中破坏合作，促使委托人采用更集体化的激励方案，但临时工不受此影响。
We investigate how changes in the commitment power of a principal affect cooperation among agents who work in a team. When the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities, workers have career concerns. Then, unless the principal can commit herself to long-term wage contracts, an implicit sabotage incentive emerges. Agents become reluctant to help their teammates. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal offers more collectively oriented incentive schemes. Temporary workers, though, are not affected by the sabotage effect, and their incentives are more individually oriented.