The Fleeting Effects of Disclosure Forthcomingness on Management's Reporting Credibility
通过实验发现，管理层及时披露信息（尤其是坏消息）能短期提升报告可信度，但这种效果不持久；长期来看，报告好消息的管理层可信度更高，与之前的披露决策无关。
This study provides a theoretical framework and experimental evidence on how managers' disclosure decisions affect their credibility with investors. I find that in the short-term, more forthcoming disclosure has a positive effect on management's reporting credibility, especially when management is forthcoming about negative news. However, these short-term credibility effects do not persist over time. In the long-term, managers who report positive earnings news are rated as having higher reporting credibility than managers who report negative earnings news, regardless of their previous disclosure decisions.