Government Ownership and Dividend Policy: Evidence from Newly Privatised Firms
研究了43个国家新私有化企业中政府所有权与股利政策的关系，发现政府持股比例越高，股利支付越低，且在法治薄弱的国家中这一效应更明显。
Abstract In this paper we examine the relationship between government ownership and dividend policy. Using a multinational sample of newly privatised firms from 43 countries, we find strong and robust evidence indicating that dividend payout is negatively related to government ownership, consistent with the predictions of agency theory. We also find that country‐level corporate governance affects the relationship between government ownership and dividend policy. Specifically, the adverse effects of government ownership on dividend policy are more pronounced in countries with weak law and order and a lower level of checks and balances. Our results are important, as they show that government ownership, as well as the institutional environment, does in fact affect the critical corporate policies, such as dividend policy, of newly privatised firms.