Advertising and Limit Pricing
扩展了Milgrom和Roberts的限制性定价模型，允许在位者通过价格和广告双重信号传递成本信息，发现信号传递会导致成本降低型扭曲，使价格偏低、广告偏高。
We enrich Milgrom and Roberts' (1982) limit-pricing model to allow an incumbent to signal his costs with both price and advertisements. Our fundamental result is that a cost-reducing distortion occurs, in that the incumbent behaves as if there were complete information but his costs were lower than they are. Preentry price is therefore distorted downward, and demand-enhancing advertising is distorted upward, as a consequence of signalling. If advertising is a purely dissipative signal, it is not used, nor therefore distorted. Recent refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are featured.