FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REGULATION AND INDIRECT ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SALES DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT OF THE 1934 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT
分析会计监管的间接经济后果，即引发企业间财富转移，以1934年证券交易法的销售披露要求为例，发现该要求导致此前已披露销售的公司获得超额收益，而未披露的公司受损。
This study analyzes an indirect economic consequence of accounting regdations ‐ that of inducing inter‐firm wealth transfers. This analysis is applied to the sales disclosure requirement of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. Using daily returns to the New York Stock Exchange and over‐the‐counter stocks, it was found that when Congressional deliberations favored passage of the 1934 Act, mturns to h s which had previously disclosed sales significantly exceeded those of non‐sales‐disclosing firms. This result is consistent with a wealth transfer having occurred from the latter to the former through an unexpected shift in competitive advantage.