Strategic Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt
研究了企业所有权结构与债务成本之间的内生关系，特别关注控制权集中度在违约后企业重组中的作用，发现控制权集中会提高债务的代理成本。
We theoretically and empirically address the endogeneity of corporate ownership structure and the cost of debt, with a novel emphasis on the role of control concentration in post-default firm restructuring. Control concentration raises agency costs of debt, and dominant shareholders trade off private benefits of control against higher borrowing costs in choosing their ownership stakes. Based on our theoretical predictions, and using an international sample of syndicated loans and unique dynamic ownership structure data, we present new evidence on the firm- and macro-level determinants of corporate control concentration and the cost of debt. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.