Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution
通过两个简化模型，分析法律对离婚的影响，重点比较财产权（如赡养费）与离婚权的作用，发现补偿家务牺牲的法律增加离婚概率，而涉及子女监护权时则降低离婚概率。
This paper challenges the view that legal rights are not important in affecting whether people divorce, but it puts as much emphasis on property rights (given, for example, by the law on alimony) as on dissolution rights. The paper sets out two stylised models of marriage and examines the consequences of fuller compensation for economic sacrifices made during marriage. If the dominant economic issue in a marriage is who undertakes household tasks then a law giving fuller compensation makes divorce more likely. If the dominant issue is child custody, divorce is less likely.