The Role of Information Revelation in Elimination Contests
研究两轮淘汰赛中信息揭示规则如何影响均衡的存在性和效率，发现完全揭示规则下不存在对称分离均衡，部分揭示规则下存在部分有效均衡，而不揭示规则最有效率且能最大化参赛者总努力。
In this article, we investigate how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. We establish that no symmetric separating equilibrium exists under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very robust. We then characterise a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when players' valuations are uniformly distributed. We finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximising the total efforts from the contestants. Within our framework, more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.