Myopic Corporate Behaviour with Optimal Management Incentives
研究了当经理人能在股票市场进行可观察但不可验证的个人交易时，股东如何设计激励合同，导致经理人偏向短期回报，且短期偏差在激励强度较低时更大。
Existing models in which stock markets lead to corporate ‘short‐termism’ rely on an exogenously imposed objective for top managers. This paper endogenizes both managers’ concern for short‐term stock prices and the resulting distortions. We show that when the manager can trade on her own account on the stock market in a way that is observable to market participants but which is not verifiable in court, shareholders will choose an incentive contract which induces a bias towards short‐term returns. Consistent with recent evidence, the short‐term bias is greater when the optimal contract provides low‐powered management incentives.