Financial Integration in Antebellum America: Strengthening Bodenhorn's Results
检验了Bodenhorn关于美国内战前金融市场一体化的假说，发现其证据不足，但数据本身更强烈地支持一体化结论。
In a recent article in this J ournal , Howard Bodenhorn made a remarkable suggestion: “Antebellum financial markets may have outperformed those of the post–Civil War period.” According to Bodenhorn, antebellum capital markets displayed notable integration, as indicated by movements in short-term (60–day) interest rate data for important commercial centers east of the Mississippi. When considered in light of Lance Davis's work, suggesting poor integration of credit markets immediately after the Civil War and only gradual integration thereafter, we believe economic historians will find Bodenhorn's hypothesis provocative—even startling. We found the hypothesis so suggestive that we attempted to replicate Bodenhorn's analysis—a process that generated both “bad news” and “good news.” The “bad news” is that we believe the evidence Bodenhorn provided for his hypothesis is weak or irrelevant. The “good news” is that the data Bodenhorn generated support the integration hypothesis more strongly than even Bodenhorn suggested.