Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs, and Ownership Control: The Case of All‐Equity Firms
发现全权益公司（无债务公司）的管理层持股更高、高管家族关系更密切、流动性更强，且家族参与运营时管理层投票权控制更强，表明投票权控制和家族关系是消除杠杆决策的重要因素。
ABSTRACT This paper provides evidence that all‐equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all‐equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all‐equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage.