Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities
证明在成本投票和私人信息环境下，当预期选民规模极大时，即使偏好某选项的选民比例极小，只要他们更“狂热”（高收益或低成本），该选项就会以高概率获胜，这违背了两种不同的规范标准。
There are many instances in which even in a democracy, the political preferences held by a minority of the electorate are reflected in political outcomes. It is shown that for a simple two‐alternative election environment characterized by costly voting and private information, when the expected population is very large the alternative preferred by more expected “zealous” voters, who have either large stakes in the outcome of the election or small costs of participating, wins with high probability in any equilibrium, even if the expected proportion of the entire electorate that shares that preference is arbitrarily small. This is an undersirable outcome under either of two natural but very different normative criteria.