The Triple Inefficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Policies
当污染跨境且存在国际贸易时，除了国际层面的低效，国内也可能出现低效。研究发现各国在纳什均衡中选择的政策会导致福利损失，但使用可交易排放配额可实现给定排放水平下的福利最大化。
Abstract When pollution is transboundary and there is international trade, a domestic inefficiency may arise in addition to the well‐known inefficiencies at the international level. More precisely, there will be a Nash equilibrium in which each country chooses a policy that gives it lower welfare than would otherwise be possible given the emission levels of all countries. However, there will also be a Nash equilibrium in which each country chooses tradable emission quotas as its policy instrument to achieve its desired level of emissions. In this Nash equilibrium, welfare in each country is maximised given the emission levels of all countries.