Simple Cost-Sharing Contracts
将Rogerson的简单采购合同分析扩展到供应商成本非均匀分布的情形，发现当高成本更可能时简单合同表现差，但一对简单合同（线性成本分摊和全额报销）总能获得最优合同73%以上的收益。
We extend William Rogerson's (2003) intriguing analysis of simple procurement contracts to settings where the supplier's innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly. Although the simple contract that Rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely, it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely. We show that in all settings under consideration, a simple pair of contracts – one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement – can always secure more than 73 percent of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract.