Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India
利用印度各邦的政治预留制度，研究强制性政治代表能否让弱势群体在政策制定中获得更多影响力，发现预留制增加了对受益群体的转移支付。
A basic premise of representative democracy is that all those subject to policy should have a voice in its making. However, policies enacted by electorally accountable governments often fail to reflect the interests of disadvantaged minorities. This paper exploits the institutional features of political reservation, as practiced in Indian states, to examine the role of mandated political representation in providing disadvantaged groups influence over policy-making. I find that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which benefit from the mandate. This finding also suggests that complete policy commitment may be absent in democracies, as is found in this case.