Collusive Price Leadership
研究一家公司率先调价、对手跟进的定价模式，发现这种价格领导在信息不对称下促进合谋，领导者利润更高，但信息极不对称时信息较少的企业更愿跟随，且价格刚性对跟随者有利，整体福利可能低于公开合谋。
The authors study the pattern of pricing in which price changes are first announced by one firm and then matched by its rivals. In their model, this price leadership facilitates collusion under asymmetric information. In equilibrium, the leader earns higher profits than the follower. Nonetheless, if information is sufficiently asymmetric, the less informed firm prefers to follow the better-informed firm, so the leader can emerge endogenously. The authors show that the follower can benefit from price rigidity so that prices may be changed infrequently. They also show that overall welfare may be lower under collusive price leadership than under overt collusion. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.