Regulating Water: A Naturological Analysis of Competing Interests Among Company, Town, and State
运用弗雷德里克（1995）的自然学视角，分析加州一家私营水务公司的费率听证过程，发现该过程偏向经济价值而非生态价值，短期利益压倒长期需求，无法同时保护用户和自然环境。
This article analyzes, through Frederick’s (1995) naturological lens, the General Rate Case (GRC) process to regulate a private water utility in California. Golden State Water Company is the utility. The GRC concerned is Ojai, California. The authors conclude that (a) Frederick’s conceptual framework proves useful to understand antecedents of effective common-pool resource management, and (b) the GRC process encourages economizing values more than it does ecologizing ones. In essence, short-term needs overshadow long-term needs, and the economizing interests of a single member of the GRC network overshadow the ecologizing interests of diverse stakeholders. By focusing only on whether the private utility’s requests are economically justified, and not on the needs of the larger ecosystem, the GRC is unable to ensure long-term protection of either (a) the ratepayer or (b) the natural environment and community.