Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions
针对个体被分配至职位时需诚实报告偏好的问题，提出一组价格使个体无动机谎报，该价格是线性规划对偶问题的最优解，通过求解两个线性规划可得最优分配和价格，模拟竞争市场实现有效配置。
The problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered. Individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned. A set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested. It is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem. Both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited. The procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well. It results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and "consumer surplus" is maximized; its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria.