Voluntary‐Threat Approaches to Reduce Ambient Water Pollution
研究通过自愿威胁方法（即允许污染者自愿达标，否则征收环境税）来监管非点源水污染，并设计了一种内生参数化方法，使合规成为唯一的子博弈完美纳什均衡，实验表明威胁税的严厉程度和沟通机会对政策效果至关重要。
This article considers the regulation of nonpoint source water pollution through the use of a voluntary‐threat approach, which allows a polluter group to meet a standard voluntarily but imposes an ambient tax upon noncompliance. In particular, we develop an “endogenous” voluntary‐threat approach that can be parameterized to induce compliance as a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and eliminate zero‐abatement equilibria. Experimental evidence on the proposed approach as well as the “exogenous” approach of Segerson and Wu (2006) suggests that the severity of the threatened tax and the opportunity for communication are critical in determining policy outcomes.