Welfare Implications of Price Stabilization with Monopolistic Trade
用一个两国模型分析国内和国际价格稳定对福利的影响，一国通过最优贸易限制行使市场力量，另一国竞争性行为，发现两种稳定对福利分布影响不同，市场力量国从国内稳定中获益，但政府与私人部门受影响不同。
Abstract The welfare effects of domestic and international price stabilization are examined and then compared, employing a two‐country model where one country exercises market power through continuous optimal trade restriction while the other behaves competitively. The two types of stabilization have quite different implications on the distribution of welfare between and within countries. The country exercising market power gains from domestic price stabilization regardless of the source of instability, but the government and private producers and consumers are affected differently. The country facing trade restriction can exercise some countervailing power by stabilizing international price fluctuations resulting from internal disturbances.