Multipoint competition, strategic similarity and entry into geographic markets
研究了多市场接触和战略相似性如何共同影响企业进入新地理市场的决策，并分析了互惠性、市场集中度和协调机制的作用，为相关理论冲突提供了调和证据。
Abstract The objective of this study is to integrate both multimarket contact and strategic similarity in the analysis of entry decisions. We also analyze the role of the reciprocity of contacts, market concentration, and coordination mechanisms at moderating the relationship. Our hypotheses are tested through the analysis of entry behavior into new geographical markets in the Spanish savings bank market. Interestingly, our results offer an opportunity of conciliating conflicting evidence in both the multimarket–mutual forbearance and the heterogeneity–rivalry literatures and offer further support to the U‐inverted influence of multimarket contact on entry. Given the coordination assumption implicit in the theory and the possible presence of unobservable variables, we also offer a method to cope with the common‐actor problem. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.