Designing and Optimal Privatisation Plan for Restructuring Firms and Institutes in Transition
研究私有化机构如何设计最优方案，包括所有权比例、补贴和行业数量，以激励代理人参与重组，并给出补贴必要性和所有权下限的条件。
A privitization authority (PA) wishes to establish and find buyers for firms it creates in those industries. Agents, facing a privatization plan specifying the percentage of ownership offered, payment (subsidy) required, and number of firms per industry, maximise expected utility which depends on profit, effort, and a random element. The PA selects the Stackelberg-optimal plan. We show the existence of this plan and conditions for uniqueness. We provide conditions under which subsidies are necessary and additional ownership must be offered as a further incentive. A lower bound on an agent′s ownership share is derived; optimal sizes of industries are established. J. Comp. Econom., August 1995, 21(1), pp. 1-28, New York University, New York, New York 10012.