The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation
研究债务重组如何影响最优贷款合同设计，发现债权人是否承诺在违约时强制破产决定了企业家负债程度，有限责任安排或外部抵押品担保分别是最优选择。
This paper studies the effect of debt renegotiation on the design of optimal loan arrangements in a model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information. Renegotiation may occur because bankruptcy involves costly asset liquidation, which is ex post inefficient. The author shows that the extent of the entrepreneur's liabilities in the optimal loan contract depends upon the creditor's commitment to impose bankruptcy should default ever occur. A limited liability arrangement is optimal whenever the creditor is precommited not to forgive any portion of the outstanding debt. Otherwise debt may efficiently be secured by outside collateral. Copyright 1994 by Ohio State University Press.