The Impact of Quotas and Tariffs on Strategic R&D Behavior
在两阶段古诺双寡头博弈中比较配额与关税对国内企业研发和产出的影响，发现配额可能降低国内研发和产出，且与关税对研发的作用方向相反。
Quotas and tariffs are compared in a two-stage Cournot duopoly game where R&D is chosen initially and output is selected subsequently. Imposing a quota at or below the free-trade import level results in either a pure-strategy or a mixed-strategy equilibrium. Compared to an equally restrictive tariff, a quota leads to higher domestic profits, but lower domestic output and R&D (in a pure-strategy equilibrium). Furthermore, a quota and a tariff may often produce opposite effects on domestic R&D. A quota set above the free-trade import level may become binding and may lead to multiple equilibria. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.