A STACKELBERG MODEL OF CHILD SUPPORT AND WELFARE*
用斯塔克尔伯格博弈模拟未婚父母在福利系统中的子女抚养费决策，发现提高抚养费豁免额会小幅增加父亲支付意愿，但显著影响母亲报告生父身份，而高额抚养费裁决反而可能减少实际支付。
This article models the child support and welfare decisions of never‐married parents on welfare as a Stackelberg game. The mother chooses whether to exit welfare, report paternity, and to obtain a formal child support order. If a child support order is obtained, the father chooses whether to comply with the order. Simulation results from the structural parameters indicate that increasing the child support disregard increases paternal compliance slightly and affects maternal paternity reporting more significantly; effects are limited, however, by low paternal incomes. Results also indicate that high award amounts can decrease expected child support payments to women on welfare.