A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures With Public Goods
系统研究了公共品规划程序中，局部真实披露偏好成为占优策略的情形，刻画了强局部个体激励相容的连续可微规划程序，并探讨了平衡性、防合谋、中性、个体理性等性质及其与MDP程序的联系。
This paper provides a systematic study of planning procedures with public goods in which local truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy. These procedures are said to be strongly locally individually incentive compatible (SLIIC). We first characterize the (time invariant) continuously differentiable planning procedures that are SLIIC. Then, we study properties such as balancedness, cheatproofness with respect to coalitions, neutrality, individual rationality and we point out the connection with the MDP procedures.