Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises*
分析跨国企业在两国经营时，面对两国规制机构的激励性规制，发现企业会偏向利润权重更大的国家，且规制联动可能产生意外效果，同时探讨了企业的游说决策和搬迁威胁对规制的影响。
Sectors with a long regulatory tradition have recently experienced intense activity by multinationals whose international operations and relocation threats represent a new cause for concern for regulators. I analyze a multinational serving two countries and being regulated by two national authorities. The firm is shown to favor, or cross‐subsidize, the country with a larger stake in the firm's profit, and the linkage among national regulations may induce unexpected effects on outputs. I also analyze a multinational's lobbying decisions and its effects on national regulations. Finally, a credible threat to “fly” away from tough regulators lets the firm obtain larger profits.