Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good
研究一种私人商品和一种部分可排他非竞争性商品的经济中的公平性，提出“免费午餐厌恶”条件，结合标准公理推导出福利平等主义形式。
We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.