How Valuable Is a Good Reputation? A Sample Selection Model of Internet Auctions
研究eBay拍卖中卖家声誉对成交价格的影响，发现卖家最初积累的几条好评能显著提升价格，但后续好评的边际收益急剧下降。
On the online auction site eBay, by convention, sellers do not ship goods to winning bidders until after they have received payment, so there is an opportunity for sellers to take advantage of bidders' trust. Realizing this, the designers of eBay created a system that relies on self-enforcement using reputation. Several recent studies have found that bidders give little or no reward to sellers who have better reputations. I show that in fact, sellers are strongly rewarded for the first few reports that they have behaved honestly, but marginal returns to additional reports are severely decreasing. 2005 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.