The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis
通过个体与市场实验，发现信息优势方难以忽略私有信息（知识诅咒），市场力量可缓解但无法消除该偏差，对谈判、企业策略和委托代理问题有启示。
In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed agents are assumed capable of reproducing the judgments of less-informed agents. We discuss a systematic violation of this assumption that we call the "curse of knowledge." Better-informed agents are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their interest to do so; more information is not always better. Comparing judgments made in individual-level and market experiments, we find that market forces reduce the curse by approximately 50 percent but do not eliminate it. Implications for bargaining, strategic behavior by firms, principal-agent problems, and choice under uncertainty are discussed.