Double Moral Hazard and Resale Price Maintenance
研究批发商与零售商均面临道德风险时，转售价格维持（RPM）如何影响双方的非价格决策和消费者价格，并解释为何在连续垄断下最低或最高转售价格限制都可能最优。
Incentives for resale price maintenance (RPM) are studied in a wholesaler-retailer relationship in which both firms make a nonprice choice subject to moral hazard. The best attainable contract has vertical externalities in both nonprice choices and the choice of consumers' price if delegated to the retailer. RPM controls the latter externality but interacts with the other externalities as well. As a consequence, either minimum or maximum vertical price fixing can be optimal in spite of a successive-monopoly specification. Similar incentives exist for writing other variables into contract, such as the capital input of the retailer.