Taking a View: Corporate Speculation, Governance, and Compensation
基于一项知名保密调查的数据，研究企业利用衍生品对利率和汇率走势进行投机的行为，发现投机源于信息和成本优势，并通过薪酬安排和内部控制来管理风险，但投资者无法从公开披露中识别投机企业。
ABSTRACT Using responses to a well‐known confidential survey, we study corporations' use of derivatives to “take a view” on interest rate and currency movements. Characteristics of speculators suggest that perceived information and cost advantages lead them to take positions actively; that is, they do not speculate to increase risk by “betting the ranch.” Speculating firms encourage managers to speculate through incentive‐aligning compensation arrangements and bonding contracts, and they use derivatives‐specific internal controls to manage potential abuse. Finally, we examine whether investors reading public corporate disclosures are able to identify firms that indicate speculating in the confidential survey; they are not.