Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property
构建了一个资源在掠夺与生产活动间分配的一般均衡模型，区分进攻性武器与防御工事，分析财产权安全性的决定因素，并探讨非攻击均衡的可能性及经济福利与产权安全的关系。
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities. The model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons, which are the instruments of predation, and fortifications, which provide defense against predation. The analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined. The analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure. The authors also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.