HETEROGENEOUS BORROWERS IN QUANTITATIVE MODELS OF SOVEREIGN DEFAULT*
扩展了主权违约的定量模型，引入不同类型政策制定者随机交替执政，发现政治更替可能在特定条件下触发违约，且政治稳定性高时违约与经济条件的相关性减弱，利差更高且波动更大。
We extend the model used in recent quantitative studies of sovereign default, allowing policymakers of different types to stochastically alternate in power. We show that a default episode may be triggered by a change in the type of policymaker in office, and that such a default is likely to occur only if there is enough political stability and if policymakers encounter poor economic conditions. Under high political stability, political turnover enables the model to generate a weaker correlation between economic conditions and default decisions, a higher and more volatile spread, and lower borrowing levels after a default episode.