Inherited Control and Firm Performance
利用CEO继任数据，发现与离任CEO、创始人或大股东有亲属关系的继任CEO所在企业，其经营盈利能力和市账比均低于聘用无关联CEO的企业，表明任人唯亲通过限制劳动力市场竞争损害了企业绩效。
I use data from chief executive officer (CEO) successions to examine the impact of inherited control on firms' performance. I find that firms where incoming CEOs are related to the departing CEO, to a founder, or to a large shareholder by either blood or marriage underperform in terms of operating profitability and market-to-book ratios, relative to firms that promote unrelated CEOs. Consistent with wasteful nepotism, lower performance is prominent in firms that appoint family CEOs who did not attend “selective” undergraduate institutions. Overall, the evidence indicates that nepotism hurts performance by limiting the scope of labor market competition.