Network competition with income effects
将网络竞争的标准模型扩展至包含需求中的收入效应，发现收入效应为正时，未受监管的网络运营商会将终止费率设定在成本之上，这支持了监管机构对过高终止费率的担忧。
I generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in demand. Empirical work has shown income effects to be positive and statistically significant. Income effects deliver theoretical results consistent with regulatory concern about excessive termination rates: unregulated network operators competing in nondiscriminatory retail contracts negotiate termination rates above cost for any positive income effect. This also holds when operators discriminate between on‐net and off‐net calls if networks are differentiated. Operators profit from increasing termination rates above cost under second‐degree price discrimination if a sufficient share of consumers prefer on‐net/off‐net contracts and their subscription demand is relatively inelastic.