Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
研究委托人雇佣多个代理人且无法监督其行动时，如何设计机制实现唯一均衡。当代理人能互相观察时，存在机制达到最优结果；当不能观察时，委托人可通过多阶段机制实现唯一次优均衡。
In this paper we consider the problem of implementation when a principal hires many agents and is not able to monitor their actions. We distinguish two cases: (i) when actions are mutually observable among agents, (ii) when actions are not observable at all. In (i), there is a mechanism in which the first-best arises as a unique perfect equilibrium. In (ii), we show by two examples that typically there are multiple equilibria if the principal merely offers a set of optimal sharing rules. However, we prove that the principal can use these optimal sharing rules as a starting point and construct a multi-stage mechanism that has a unique second-best perfect Bayesian equilibrium.