Delegating Decisions to Experts
构建了一个委托模型，分析自私且拥有私人信息的专家团队如何影响决策者的委托选择。研究发现，决策者倾向于任命立场较温和的专家以促进信息整合，并通过选择性委托来保护自身利益。
We present a model of delegation with self-interested and privately informed experts. A team of experts with extreme but opposite biases is acceptable to a wide range of decision makers with diverse preferences, but the value of expertise from such a team is low. A decision maker wants to appoint experts who are less partisan than he is in order to facilitate information pooling by the expert team. Selective delegation, either by controlling the decision-making process or by conditioning the delegation decision on his own information, is an effective way for the decision maker to safeguard own interests while making use of expert information. © 2004 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.