Elections, Capital Flows, and Politico-Economic Equilibria
研究开放经济中亲劳工与亲企业候选人竞争选举，选举结果受外债影响，同时外债反映选举预期，导致波动加剧和政治经济危机，并讨论承诺税收政策的效果。
We study an open economy where a pro-labor and a pro-business candidate compete in an election. The winner chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. Electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt, but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election. The resulting interaction is novel and has several implications. Elections are associated with increased volatility. Politico-economic crises can occur. Inefficiencies vanish if the candidates commit to an appropriate tax policy, but such commitments have predictable effects on the election. Empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed.