Imperfect Information and Credible Communication
分析发送方与接收方激励不一致时的沟通博弈，发现发送方信息质量与沟通质量呈非单调关系，且在不完全信息下沟通质量最高，适用于股权研究分析师向投资者传递信息的情境。
This paper analyzes a communication game between a sender and receiver with misaligned incentives. Because of the misalignment, in equilibrium, the sender's privately observed information is not perfectly communicated. We study the relation between the quality of the sender's information and the quality of the information communicated. We establish that the quality of information communicated is a non‐monotonic function of the quality of the sender's information, and it is maximized when the sender has imperfect information. We suggest that our model applies to a setting where an equity research analyst communicates information about a firm's value to investors.