A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Horizontal Mergers
构建了一个动态模型，将合并、投资、进入和退出作为企业理性选择的内生变量，用于分析合并对行业均衡的影响，可作为反垄断政策分析工具。
I develop a dynamic model of mergers, where mergers, investment, entry, and exit are endogenous variables rationally chosen by firms to maximize expected future profits. This model differs from previous analyses in that it incorporates dynamics and endogenizes the merger process. The model generates reasonable predictions: allowing for mergers has the expected effect on entry, exit, investment, and surpluses; changes in tastes and technologies affect industry equilibrium in plausible ways. The results demonstrate that this type of analysis is feasible and can potentially be used as a tool for antitrust policy analysis.