Coordination and learning in dynamic global games: experimental evidence
通过两阶段动态全局博弈实验，研究信息动态到达如何影响投机者的攻击行为，发现首阶段过度攻击源于信念而非偏好，失败后学习降低攻击性，但新信息又提升攻击性。
Abstract Coordination problems are ubiquitous in social and economic life. Political mass demonstrations, the decision whether to join a speculative currency attack, investment in a risky venture, and capital flight from a particular country are all characterized by coordination problems. Furthermore, all these events have a dynamic nature which has been largely omitted from previous experimental studies. Here I use a two-stage variant of a dynamic global game to study experimentally how the arrival of information in a dynamic setting affects the relative aggressiveness of speculators. In the first stage, subjects exhibit excess aggressiveness, which appears to be driven by beliefs about others’ actions rather than an intrinsic taste for attacking. However, following a failed first-stage attack, subjects learn to be less aggressive in the second stage. On the other hand, the arrival of new, more precise information after a failed attack leads to an increase in subjects’ aggressiveness. Beliefs, again, play a crucial role in explaining how the arrival of information affects attacking behavior.