Competition from Fish Farming in Influencing Rent Dissipation: The Crawfish Fishery
研究水产养殖如何通过增加供给、降低价格，减少公共渔业中的租金消散和福利损失，并以1978年路易斯安那州小龙虾养殖与野生捕捞为例，发现养殖使潜在福利损失降低76%。
Abstract As fish farming has emerged to compete with a preexisting common property fishery sector, rent dissipation and consequently welfare losses may be reduced. Fish farming increases the increment to supply resulting in lower prices, which reduces the quantity supplied by the commons. Welfare gains accrue only when marginal cost is rising faster than average cost, which is the usual case in the wild fisheries. Using data from the Louisiana pond and wild crawfishing industries, it was shown that for the year 1978, fish farming of crawfish reduced potential welfare losses by 76 percent.