Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation
分析国际金融监管中公平竞争环境的利弊，发现其虽有利于监管较弱的经济体，但可能损害监管较强的经济体，而跨国银行能缓解这种损害。
ABSTRACT We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best‐regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a cherry‐picking effect that lowers the size and efficiency of banks in weaker economies. Hence, while a laissez faire policy favors the better‐regulated economy, level playing fields are good for weaker regulators. We show that multinational banking mitigates the cherry‐picking effect, and reduces the damage that a level playing field causes in the better‐regulated economy.