Deposit Insurance and the Discount Window: Pricing under Asymmetric Information
研究银行拥有私人财务信息时，如何联合设计存款保险和贴现窗口的风险敏感定价，使银行通过选择条款揭示资产质量，贴现窗口充当风险中性的最后贷款人。
ABSTRACT The risk‐sensitive pricing of deposit insurance and the discount window is determined in an environment where banks have private information concerning their financial conditions. The two facilities are managed jointly; an incentive‐compatible policy is designed such that banks' choice of terms at which they can obtain insurance and access to discount window credit will reveal their asset quality. The function of the discount window is to be a risk‐neutral “lender of last resort” to banks in a market dominated by risk‐averse depositors.