The Information Content of Dividend and Capital Structure Policies
重新检验信号与代理理论，发现自由现金流假说意味着过度投资和投资不足企业的信息效应强于价值最大化企业；股利与资本结构政策共同提供未来现金流的预测信息，且信息量与托宾q呈U型关系。
We reexamine signaling and agency theories and argue that the free-cashflow hypothesis implies a stronger information effect for both over- and underinvesting firms than for value-maximizing firms. Our results indicate that dividend and capital structure policies interact to provide significant predictive information about future cash flow. We also find a U-shaped relation between the amount of information and Tobin’s q. The minimum of this relation occurs near a q value of one. This outcome implies a stronger information effect for both over- and underinvesting firms than for value-maximizing firms.