The Allocation of Resources by Voting
提出一个关于投票的通用理论，解释在什么条件下投票会被选为资源分配方式，以及投票章程如何构建。通过公寓业主协会的章程数据，检验了投票权分配、决策范围及最优投票规则的含义。
A general theory of voting, which explains under what conditions voting will be chosen as a means for allocating resources and how the constitution that governs the voting will be structured is presented. It is hypothesized that developers of voting organizations will structure their organizations in order to maximize the value of shares sold by minimizing the expected costs of wealth transfer and decision making in the voting organization. Implications regarding the allocation of votes and assessments within the organization, the domain of voting decisions, and the optimal voting rule are tested with data on the constitutional structure of condominium homeowner associations.