A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two‐way access pricing: no termination‐based price discrimination
研究两个网络之间的接入定价规则，发现当企业进行线性价格竞争时，存在唯一线性规则能实现拉姆齐结果；当采用两部收费时，存在一类规则使企业将可变价格设定为边际成本，从而允许监管者追求消费者剩余或投资等额外目标。
We study access pricing rules that determine the access prices between two networks as a linear function of marginal costs and (average) retail prices set by both networks. When firms compete in linear prices, there is a unique linear rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium, independently of underlying demand conditions . When firms compete in two‐part tariffs, there exists a class of rules under which firms choose the variable price equal to the marginal cost. Therefore, the regulator can choose among these rules to pursue additional objectives such as increasing consumer surplus or promoting socially optimal investment.