Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
研究不完全合同的设计问题，分析在专用投资和风险分担情境下，简单合同能否通过有限修订实现最优效率。对合同经济学和风险管理研究者有参考价值。
An optimal contract design problem is considered. Contracts which are incomplete and simple are used to investigate the extent to which constrained revisions can mitigate inefficiencies resulting from contractual incompleteness. An optimal contract is characterized in two cases. First, when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two risk-neutral parties who must make relationship-specific investments, it is possible to implement the first-best by a simple contract. Second, when a contract is being used to share risk, it is generally not possible to implement the first-best. When one party is risk neutral, however, it is possible to implement the first-best by assigning all the ex post decision rights to that party.